because ' a perfectly good security is given for the money received/' would seem rather futile to those who paid £1000 and received a security, the present value of which might be below ^10. They might very likely think that outright confiscation (since confiscation originally means nothing but " putting into the Treasury ") is really a simpler way of dealing with the problem. " Ex-M.P.," however, estimates that the immediate redemption of £2800 millions of debt (which he, rather modestly, expects to be the result of his 20 per cent, levy) would enable the balance of the War Debt to be converted into 3| per cent, stock. This may be true, but if so it is equally true if a similar or larger amount of debt is cancelled by means of an outright Levy on Capital.

The merits and demerits of a Levy on Capital have already been dealt with in the pages of this Journal. " Ex-M.P.," however, brought forward a slightly novel form of argument in its favour. He pointed out that the money constituting the great increase in debt that has taken place during the war will have been, in the main, contributed by people who have worked at home under the protection of the Army and Navy, while the soldiers and sailors have been prevented by the duty which sent them out to risk their lives from subscribing a proportionate share to the National Debt. Hence " a class that deserves most of the State will find itself indebted

to a class which—if it does not deserve least of the State—has, at any rate, turned a national emergency to personal profit." This is a strong argument, which has been used frequently in the course of the war in the pages